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Despite the best effort of the tobacco control community over a number of decades, tobacco 
use continues to kill millions of people each year.    The various control measures that have 
been introduced in many countries have helped to curtail that number, but such restrictions 
have generally been vehemently opposed[1, 2] and actively undermined/bypassed by the 
tobacco industry (see for example their recent efforts in regards to the EU menthol ban[3, 4]).  
While very unwelcome, such actions are no surprise as tobacco companies need to maintain 
their position in markets so that they can continue to sell their products and hence earn 
profits for their owners.   
Inordinate Profits 
These profits are as addictive as the tobacco that generates them, as manufacturing and 
selling tobacco products like cigarettes is astonishingly profitable, even with tobacco excise 
duty to pay. In 2018, the most recent year for which figures are reported, the world’s six 
largest cigarette manufacturers made profits (before income taxes) of more than US$55bn[5-
10].   That is more than the combined profits (US$51bn) of, for example, Coca-Cola, Pepsico, 
Nestle, Mondelez, Fedex, General Mills, Starbucks, Heineken, and Carlsberg, who collectively 
own many household brands with global appeal[11-19]. 
Such massive profits are possible because the tobacco companies are able to earn very high 
profit margins on their sales.  For instance, in 2018 Imperial Brands reported a margin on 
global operating profits of 46%[5], with that rising to 63% in the UK market (which actually 
increased to 71% in 2019)[20]. This means for every £100 that the company globally 
generated in revenue after paying excise taxes, £46 of it was profits.  Such margins are 
phenomenal when compared to those earned by firms in other industries. For instance, the 
global comparator companies mentioned above generally earned operating profit margins of 
around 15/16%, with the outliers earning a low of 6.5% (Fedex) and a high of 26.7% (Coca-
Cola)[11-19]. 
Tobacco companies can make such extreme margins and hence overall profits because they 
sell very addictive products that cost little to make, require very little on-going R&D 
expenditures on their key products, and can sell at relatively high prices.   The companies also 
benefit from a lack of the competitive market pressures that firms in other sectors regularly 
face, in significant part because of tobacco control restrictions. For example, prohibitions on 
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advertising/promotion that make it hard for new firms to enter the market and thereby 
increase competition/lower profit margins.   Such powerful positions therefore allow the 
firms to, amongst other things, offset falling sales volumes with higher prices.  
A new possibility for Tobacco Control 
The problem with such large and enduring profits is they not only provide a very strong 
incentive to maintain current markets, but they also provide tobacco companies the means 
to fight new tobacco control measures.  This gives them both the desire and ability to keep 
making these profits by continuing to sell the cigarettes that currently provide the 
overwhelming majority of their profits.    Changing this profit story would therefore represent 
a game-changing possibility for tobacco control, as the companies will lose interest in selling 
products like cigarettes if they can’t profit from doing so.  Quite how this can be done needs 
some imagination, and will likely need to vary based on local market conditions and legal 
possibilities.  A good starting point is to curtail the power the industry has to set it retail 
prices[21-24], which will also then make excise taxes more effective.  Another option would 
be to massively increase the income taxes paid on the profits earned[25] so they cannot really 
benefit from the sale of such harmful products.  Let’s be innovative as a community!  Unless 
such policies are adopted, tobacco companies will keep profiting from the harm and misery 
they create, and the incremental expansion of traditional tobacco control measures will be 
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